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LOUIS P. MALICK* 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C.:  
States Enforcing State Laws Against National Banks 
I. Introduction 
The Supreme Court held in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.1 that state 
attorneys general may bring suit against national banks to enforce non-preempted 
state laws.2 In so doing, the Court invalidated a federal regulation interpreting the 
National Bank Act that gave the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency exclusive 
visitorial control over national banks.3 Although the Court made clear that the 
states’ role is limited to law enforcement and does not include administrative con-
trol,4 this new rule has the potential to subject national banks to “unduly burden-
some and duplicative state regulation”—the very difficulty the National Bank Act 
was designed to prevent.5 The recent financial crisis has spurred calls for more ex-
pansive regulation of financial institutions, but these arguments go too far. Con-
sumers need smarter regulation, and not just more regulation from multiple levels 
of government.6 Cuomo may have opened a Pandora’s Box of conflicting regulation 
and inconsistent enforcement by fifty states that will be of untold cost to the bank-
ing industry and, by extension, consumers.7 
II. The Case 
In the course of investigating the lending practices of certain banks and their sub-
sidiaries operating in New York, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer noticed 
                                                                
© 2011 Louis P. Malick. 
 * J.D. 2011, University of Maryland School of Law. 
 1. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 2721. 
 3. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2009) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006)). 
 4. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721. 
 5. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007). 
 6. See infra Part V. 
 7. See infra Part V. 
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racial disparities in data concerning home loan prices.8 The Attorney General ad-
vised several of these national banks of his investigation through “letters of inquiry” 
and asked the banks to voluntarily disclose non-public lending information “[i]n 
lieu of issuing a formal subpoena.”9 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”) filed a complaint and moved for a preliminary injunction against the At-
torney General,10 claiming the investigation intruded on the OCC’s exclusive au-
thority as visitor of national banks.11 The Attorney General conceded that his action 
was barred by an OCC regulation  interpreting the National Bank Act (“NBA”) to 
vest the OCC with exclusive visitorial power,12 but argued that the regulation was 
“an impermissible construction” of the statute.13 
The Clearing House Association, L.L.C. (“Clearing House”) brought a separate 
action against the Attorney General on the same day.14 The action raised many of 
                                                                
 8. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005)[herinafter “OCC”]. 
 9. Id. at 388 (internal citation omitted). These national banks included Citibank, N.A., JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., HSBC Bank USA, N.A., and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Id. at 387. The Attorney General pointed to 
N.Y. EXEC. § 296-a(1) (McKinney 2009), which provides:  
“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any creditor or any officer, agent or employee 
thereof: . . . In the case of applications for credit with respect to the purchase . . . of any housing ac-
commodation . . . to discriminate against any such applicant because of the race . . . of such appli-
cant . . . in the granting, withholding, extending or renewing, or in the fixing of the rates, terms or 
conditions of, any such credit.”  
The Attorney General relied for enforcement authority on N.Y. EXEC. § 63(12) (McKinney 2009), which allows 
the attorney general to apply for an injunction in state court “[w]henever any person shall engage in repeated 
fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or 
transaction of business.” 
 10. Id. at 387. 
 11. Id. at 388. 
 12. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(1) (2009) (“Only the OCC or an authorized representative of the OCC may exer-
cise visitorial powers with respect to national banks, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section. State 
officials may not exercise visitorial powers with respect to national banks, . . . except in limited circumstances 
authorized by federal law.”). See also id. at § 7.4000(b)(2) (“Exception for courts of justice. National banks are 
subject to such visitorial powers as are vested in the courts of justice. This exception pertains to the powers in-
herent in the judiciary and does not grant state or other governmental authorities any right to inspect, superin-
tend, direct, regulate or compel compliance by a national bank with respect to any law, regarding the content or 
conduct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal law.”). 
 13. OCC, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 390. The Attorney General in fact filed a counterclaim against the OCC, ar-
guing that 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 should be invalidated under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
Clearing House Ass’n L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2007). The Administrative Procedure Act 
provides in part that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)(2006). 
 14. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Clearing House 
is owned by several commercial banks and was “[e]stablished in 1853 to simplify the exchange of checks and 
improve the efficiency of the payments system . . . [and today] provides payment services for check, electronic 
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the same issues as the complaint brought by the OCC, but the Clearing House also 
sought to enjoin the Attorney General from “[suing] national banks in the state’s 
parens patriae capacity for alleged violations of the [Fair Housing Act’s] fair lending 
provisions.”15 The district court accepted the two cases as related and consolidated 
the trials with hearings on the applications for preliminary injunctions pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).16 
The district court applied the framework prescribed by the Supreme Court in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,17 for determining 
whether a federal agency’s regulation represents a permissible construction of its 
statutory authority.18 The district court noted that Chevron directs a court to defer 
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute where the statute is silent or ambiguous on 
the specific question at issue.19 The Attorney General argued that, contrary to the 
OCC’s interpretation, the NBA was only meant to prohibit “state administrative of-
ficials from directly supervising national banks,” and did not prohibit state law en-
forcement officials from enforcing state laws through judicial process.20 The district 
                                                                                                                                                    
check, ACH and wire transfer . . . [and] includes industry forums to discuss and take action in issues critical to 
its owners.” About Us, THE CLEARING HOUSE, http://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/000211f.php. 
 15. Clearing House Ass’n, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 622. A provision of the federal Fair Housing Act, codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 3613 (2006), provides a civil cause of action for an “aggrieved person[,]” § 3613(a), to sue for damages 
or injunctive relief based on “a discriminatory housing practice[,]” § 3613(c). Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by 
which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen . . . . [however t]he state ordinari-
ly has no standing to sue on behalf of its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be served by the suit.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
 16. Clearing House Ass’n, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 623. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) provides: 
Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits. Before or after the commencement of the hearing 
of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the me-
rits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this consolida-
tion is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunction which 
would be admissible upon the trial on the merits becomes part of the record on the trial and need 
not be repeated upon the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save 
to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2) (2006). 
 17. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See infra Part III. 
 18. See OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383, 391 (2005). The court rejected the Attorney General’s argu-
ment that the court should instead apply a “presumption against preemption” or at least “a heightened degree 
of judicial skepticism” because the OCC’s interpretation of the National Bank Act “interferes with the tradition-
al state interest in enforcing its own laws, and in protecting its citizens from discriminatory conduct.” Id. at 
391–92. Instead, the court followed Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The pre-
sumption against federal preemption disappears . . . in fields of regulation that have been substantially occupied 
by federal authority for an extended period of time. Regulation of federally chartered banks is one such area.”) 
(quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 817 
(2005)). 
 19. OCC, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 391. 
 20. See id. at 394. 
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court disagreed.21 The district court determined that the OCC regulation was in line 
with the Act’s objective of creating a comprehensive and exclusive scheme of federal 
banking regulation.22 The OCC’s regulation was thus reasonable and entitled to 
Chevron deference.23 The district court therefore enjoined the Attorney General 
from enforcing state or federal fair lending laws against national banks through the 
judicial process or by compelling national banks’ compliance with extra-judicial 
state investigations.24 
In the related Clearing House action, the district court found that the OCC’s in-
terpretation that the NBA vested the OCC with exclusive visitorial authority over 
national banks prohibited a parens patriae action against national banks because pa-
rens patriae standing doctrine requires states to invoke a quasi-sovereign authority.25 
The Attorney General argued that a Fair Housing Act provision allowing enforce-
ment actions by “aggrieved persons”26 represented a congressional grant of parens 
patriae authority that fell within the “authorized by [f]ederal law” exception of the 
NBA.27 Although the district court acknowledged that rights of action for aggrieved 
persons could allow states to enforce federal rights through parens patriae actions,28 
the court found that it could not resort to general parens patriae principles in this 
                                                                
 21. See id. at 397. The court also found that, because residential mortgage lending is authorized by federal 
banking law and the OCC has power both to regulate lending activity and to enforce state and federal laws 
against national banks. See id. at 395. The Supreme Court’s holding in First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 
263 U.S. 640 (1924), “[did] not foreclose the OCC from interpreting [the Act]’s limitation on visitorial powers 
to encompass state efforts to enforce non-preempted state laws that regulate the business of banking.” OCC, 396 
F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 22. See OCC, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
 23. See id. at 404. 
 24. See id. at 407. 
 25. See Clearing House Ass’n v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The court reviewed the 
parens patriae doctrine as discussed in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
607 (1982) (explaining that, in order to establish standing, “[a] State must articulate an interest apart from the 
interests of particular private parties . . . . [t]he State must express a quasi-sovereign interest . . . [and the State 
must allege] injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population”). See also New York v. 11 Cornwell 
Co., 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (“Parens pa-
triae standing also requires a finding that individuals could not obtain complete relief through a private suit.”).  
 26. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“An aggrieved person may commence a civ l action . . . to obtain 
appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice or breach.”). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) 
(2006) (“‘Aggrieved person’ includes any person who – (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory 
housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is 
about to occur.”). 
 27. See Clearing House, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 627, 628; 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) (“No national bank shall be 
subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law . . .”). 
 28. See Clearing House, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 628; see also Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., 
Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2002) (approving district court’s statement that “‘the federal statutes under 
which states have been granted parens patriae standing all contain broad civil enforcement provisions’ that 
‘permit suit by any ‘person’ that is ‘injured’ or aggrieved’”). 
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case.29 Instead, the court examined the statutory scheme and found that, because the 
FHA enforcement provisions were “carefully drawn” and Congress explicitly 
created narrow exceptions through which states might exercise visitorial authority 
over national banks, the FHA “aggrieved persons” provision did not constitute  
congressional authorization for states to enforce FHA fair lending provisions 
against national banks by bringing parens patriae actions.30 The district court there-
fore enjoined the Attorney General from using the state’s parens patriae authority to 
judicially enforce FHA provisions against national banks.31 
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in OCC, but vacated 
the judgment in Clearing House because the issue of FHA enforcement was not yet 
ripe for review.32 Writing for the panel, Judge Parker applied the Chevron frame-
work and rejected the Attorney General’s arguments that Chevron should not apply 
because there was no clear congressional intent to prohibit states from enforcing 
non-preempted state laws against national banks.33  
Although the Second Circuit found that the precise meaning of “visitorial pow-
ers” was not clear from either the text of the National Bank Act or its common law 
interpretation, it declined to accept the Attorney General’s argument that “visitorial 
powers” only referred to administrative authority over national banks34—especially 
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent implication in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 
                                                                
 29. See id. at 629 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 259 (1972)). 
 30. See id. at 629, 630–31. See also Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., 287 F.3d at 121–22 (holding that states 
have no parens patriae standing where the statute at issue does not specifically provide for parens patriae actions 
and the statute does not evince a clear Congressional intent to allow such actions). 
 31. Clearing House, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 632. 
 32. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 110, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2007). Because the Clearing 
House’s claim for permanent injunctive relief was not yet ripe, the district court lacked jurisdiction and the 
Second Circuit therefore remanded the claim with instructions to dismiss. Id. at 124–25. Anthony Cuomo was 
automatically substituted as appellant in place of former Attorney General Eliot Spitzer per Fed. R  App. P. 
43(c)(2). Id. at 105. This rule provides: 
(2) Automatic Substitution of Officeholder. When a public officer who is a party to an appeal or 
other proceeding in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the ac-
tion does not abate. The public officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party. Pro-
ceedings following the substitution are to be in the name of the substituted party, but any 
misnomer that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties may be disregarded. An or-
der of substitution may be entered at any time, but failure to enter an order does not affect 
the substitution. 
FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(2) (2006). 
 33. Id. at 114. Like the district court, the Second Circuit found that no presumption against federal 
preemption applies to national bank regulation because it has long been an area of federal concern. Id. at 113 
(citing Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 34. Id. at 117. 
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N.A.35 “that investigation and enforcement by state officials are just as much aspects 
of visitorial authority as registration and other forms of administrative supervi-
sion.”36 Because the underlying statute was ambiguous, the court proceeded to de-
termine whether the OCC’s regulation was a permissible construction of the sta-
tute.37 The court remarked that “[t]he OCC’s analysis is at or near the outer limits 
of [Chevron]” because the OCC engaged in little fact-finding and “accretes a great 
deal of regulatory authority to itself at the expense of the states through rulemaking 
lacking any real intellectual rigor or depth.”38 Nevertheless, the court found that the 
OCC’s regulation was a permissible construction of the statute because it struck a 
proper balance between establishing a uniform system of federal regulation for na-
tional banks and preserving state sovereignty over national banks in areas other 
than “[federally] authorized banking powers.”39 
Judge Cardamone agreed with the court’s judgment that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the Clearing House’s claim regarding the FHA.40 He dissented, 
however, because the OCC’s regulation “[casts] the states into a permanent junior 
or inferior position vis-à-vis the national government.”41 He feared that the regula-
tion “portends the power to destroy the constitutional concept of federalism, an in-
dispensable component of our free society.”42 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari43 to determine whether the OCC’s regula-
tion was a reasonable construction of the NBA.44 
III. Legal Background 
Administrative agencies have no authority other than that given by legislative 
enactment.45 They exist to make regulations and manage programs in such a way 
                                                                
 35. 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007) (invalidating Michigan registration and inspection requirements as applied to 
mortgage lending subsidiaries of national banks because “state regulators cannot interfere with the ‘business of 
banking’ by subjecting national banks or their OCC-licensed operating subsidiaries to multiple audits and sur-
veillance under rival oversight regimes”). 
 36. Clearing House, 510 F.3d at 116. See Watters, 550 U.S. at 14. 
 37. Clearing House, 510 F.3d at 117–18. 
 38. Id. at 119. 
 39. Id. at 120. 
 40. Id. at 126 (Cardamone, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (mem.). 
 44. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714–15 (2009). 
 45. See La. Public Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to 
act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers 
power upon it.”). 
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that carries out Congress’s legislative intent.46 When a plaintiff challenges an admin-
istrative regulation promulgated by a federal agency, a reviewing court must apply 
the Supreme Court’s Chevron47 framework to determine whether the agency’s inter-
pretation is entitled to deference as a permissible construction of its statutory au-
thority.48 Congress gave the federal Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”) the authority to regulate national banks by enacting the National Bank 
Act of 1864.49 The OCC  interpreted the NBA as giving it exclusive visitorial powers 
over national banks.50 Visitation is a broad common law public right that legisla-
tures exercise to oversee the corporations they charter.51 Courts have traditionally 
interpreted the NBA as a shield that protects national banks from state regulation.52 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that national banks are subject only to fed-
eral regulation and that states may not interfere with their activities.53 
A. Where a statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, courts will ordinarily 
defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute 
In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,54 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-step framework courts use when determining whether a federal agen-
cy’s regulation is a valid interpretation of a statute it is charged to administer.55 First, 
the court must determine whether Congress has clearly and directly addressed the 
precise question at issue.56 If the statute is unambiguous, the statute controls: “the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent 
of Congress.”57 If the statute is ambiguous, however, the court must then determine 
                                                                
 46. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976) (“The rulemaking power granted to an 
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, 
it is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.’”) (quot-
ing Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)). 
 47. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 48. See infra Part III.A. See also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (citing 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45) (noting that disagreement in interpretation of statute between two state high 
courts suggested statute was ambiguous, and that “[i]t is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of 
agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are charged with administering”). 
 49. 13 Stat. 99, 116 (1864), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 93a & 484 (2006). 
 50. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(1) (2009). See also infra Part III.D. 
 51. See infra Part III.C. 
 52. See infra Part III.B. 
 53. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). See also infra Part III.D. 
 54. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 55. Id. at 842–44. 
 56. Id. at 842. 
 57. Id. at 842–43. For example, in Watters, the Court concluded that the NBA unambiguously prohibited 
states from regulating operating subsidiaries of national banks. Watters, 550 U.S. at 15. The NBA expressly au-
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“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the sta-
tute.”58 If a court previously interpreted the statute at issue and imposed a judicial 
construction which “follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency discretion,” the “prior judicial construction” is control-
ling and any subsequent construction by the agency is not entitled to Chevron defe-
rence.59 Nevertheless, a court must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of 
the statute “even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the 
best statutory interpretation.”60 
                                                                                                                                                    
thorized national banks to engage in mortgage lending, which was the purpose of the operating subsidiaries at 
issue in Watters. Id. at 12; see also 12 U.S.C. § 371(a). Another federal statute allowed national bank subsidiaries 
to “engage only in activities national banks may engage in directly, ‘subject to the same terms and conditions 
that govern the conduct of such activities by national banks.’” Id. at 16 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A)). The 
Court returned to the NBA, which vests the OCC with exclusive visitorial authority over national banks, and 
concluded that Congress clearly intended to prohibit states from imposing inspection, registration or licensing 
requirements on national bank subsidiaries. Id. at 19–21; 12 U.S.C. § 371(a). 
 58. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. For example, in NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995), the Court upheld an OCC decision granting permission to a national bank to sell 
annuities. Id. at 254. The Court concluded that it was permissible for the OCC to construe the “business of 
banking” over which the OCC had exclusive visitorial authority to include the sale of annuities. Id. at 263–64. 
See also Ramyn Atri, Comment, Cuomo v. Clearing House Association: The Latest Chapter in the OCC’s Pursuit 
of Chevron Deference, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 467, 474–75 (2010). 
 59. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). In Brand X, the 
Court held that Chevron required deference toward a Federal Communications Commission ruling that broad-
band internet providers were telecommunications carriers exempt from mandatory regulation under the 
Communications Act of 1934—even in the face of a contrary judicial interpretation— because the statute at 
issue was ambiguous. Id. at 982–83. The Court worried that a contrary rule would mean that the controlling 
interpretation would be the interpretation which was first in time, rather than the interpretation which was a 
more logical construction of the statute. Id. at 983. 
 60. Id. at 980. See also G & T Terminal Packaging Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 468 F.3d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[U]nless we find the [agency’s] construction of the statute to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary 
to the statute,’ we must yield to that construction of the statute even if we would reach a different conclusion of 
our own accord.”) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844) (citations omitted). In Chevron, for example, the Court 
sustained regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency as a permissible construction of the 
Clean Air Act. 467 U.S. at 845. The Court found that the EPA Administrator fairly reconciled two competing 
policy goals: reducing air pollution and allowing for economic growth. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. The Court 
concluded: 
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, 
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether t is a reasonable 
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal 
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by 
those who do. 
Id. In Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996), the Court upheld an OCC regulation interpreting 
“interest” in 12 U.S.C. § 85  to include late payment fees. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (1996). A credit card cus-
tomer challenged a late payment fee enforced by her bank in South Dakota because it would be illegal in her 
domiciliary of California. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 737–38. The Court found that the statute, which provided that 
national banks may charge “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is located,” 
was ambiguous at least in part because the supreme courts of California and New Jersey had reached opposing 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 495 
B. The National Bank Act was intended to shield national banks from both hostile and 
neutral state regulation 
The National Bank Act was enacted by the Thirty-Eighth Congress in 186461 and is 
now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 484.62 In its current form, the Act provides: 
(a) No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as au-
thorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as shall be, or 
have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either House thereof or by 
any committee of Congress or of either House duly authorized. 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, lawfully authorized State 
auditors and examiners may, at reasonable times and upon reasonable no-
tice to a bank, review its records solely to ensure compliance with applicable 
State unclaimed property or escheat laws upon reasonable cause to believe 
that the bank has failed to comply with such laws.63 
The Act generally places national banks under federal regulatory control, with a 
limited exception for states to enforce their own unclaimed property or escheat 
laws.64 The Act was intended “[t]o prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation 
from impairing the national [banking] system,” and courts “have repeatedly made 
                                                                                                                                                    
conclusions regarding its meaning. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739; 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). The Court noted that the 
relevant question “is not whether [the OCC’s interpretation] represents the best interpretation of the statute, 
but whether it represents a reasonable one,” and found that “[t]he answer is obviously yes.” Id. at 744–45. See 
also Atri, supra note 58, at 490 (discussing the Court’s Chevron jurisprudence in cases involving implications of 
federalism). 
 61. 13 Stat. 99 (1864), now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006). In particular, Chapter 106 § 54 provides 
“[t]hat the comptroller of the currency . . . shall appoint a suitable person or persons to make an examination of 
the affairs of every banking association . . . . And the association shall not be subject to any other visitorial pow-
ers than such as are authorized by this act, except such as are vested in the several courts of law and chancery.”  
 62. 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., State by Lord v. First Nat’l Bank of St. Paul, 313 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Minn. 1981). In Lord, the 
court found that the NBA did not preempt a state from requiring a national bank to open its records to the 
Minnesota state treasurer “to determine if the bank has complied with the Minnesota Uniform Disposition of 
Unclaimed Property Act.” Id. The court found that such inspection did not constitute visitorial powers and 
therefore did not fall within the OCC’s exclusive purview. Id. The Lord court was interpreting an older version 
of § 484 than the Court in Cuomo, however, paragraph (b) of the statute  was not added until the 1982 version, 
a result of  P.L. 97-320 (1982), 96 Stat. 1469 and 97-467. It is not clear whether this change was in response to 
the Lord case or not. See also Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). In Luckett, a national bank 
sued the Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue challenging a state law as applied to national banks which re-
quired banks “to turn over to the state, deposits which have remained inactive and unclaimed for specified pe-
riods.” Id. at 236. The Court upheld the Kentucky statute because it was a permissible extension of the ancient 
common law doctrine of escheat to presumptively abandoned funds and it did not discriminate against national 
banks. See id. at 251–53. 
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clear that federal control shields national banking from unduly burdensome and 
duplicative state regulation.”65 
The Court made clear as early as 1896 that national banks are constructions of 
federal law and states may not attempt “to define their duties or control the con-
duct of their affairs” wherever such attempt would conflict with federal law, fru-
strate the purpose of national banks, or impair their efficiency.66 The Court has re-
cently traced federal control of national banking as far back as M’Culloch v. 
Maryland67—some 45 years before the National Bank Act was passed in 1864—
where Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, held that states could not con-
stitutionally levy taxes on federally-created national banks.68 In Easton v. Iowa,69 the 
Court noted that state legislatures may not interfere with national banks, “whether 
with hostile or friendly intentions.”70 In Easton, the Court struck down state legisla-
tion that was intended to boost public confidence in national banks by requiring a 
“higher degree of diligence” of bank officers because it found that Congress had not 
“intended to leave the field open for the States to attempt to promote the welfare 
and stability of national banks by direct legislation.”71 The Court warned that “[i]f 
[states] had such power it would have to be exercised and limited by their own dis-
cretion, and confusion would necessarily result from control possessed and exer-
cised by two independent authorities.”72 
Federal control is not absolute, however. The Court has long held that “national 
banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws 
or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks’ functions.”73 In First 
                                                                
 65. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007) (holding that national bank subsidiary was not 
subject to state registration requirements or state supervision because “[d]iverse and duplicative superinten-
dence of national banks’ engagement in the business of banking . . . is precisely what the NBA was designed to 
prevent.” Id. at 13–14). See also Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 538 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2003) (holding that cause 
of action against national banks for usury arose under federal law for purposes of motion to remove case to 
federal court, in part because “[u]niform rules limiting the liability of national banks and prescribing exclusive 
remedies for their overcharges are an integral part of a banking system that needed protection from ‘possible 
unfriendly State legislation.’”) (quoting Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 412 (1873) (discussing need 
to protect national banks from state legislation regarding interest rates)). 
 66. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896). 
 67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 68. See id. at 436. 
 69. 188 U.S. 220 (1903). 
 70. Id. at 238. 
 71. Id. at 231–32. The Court found that state legislation requiring officers of national banks to suspend 
operations when the bank became insolvent would not benefit banks because it would limit the directors’ busi-
ness discretion and even impose criminal penalties for exercising that discretion. Id. at 232. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944) (upholding a state forfeiture law for aban-
doned accounts as applied to national banks). 
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National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri,74 the Court upheld a Missouri statute prohi-
biting branch banks—even of federally chartered national banks—because it did 
not “interfere with the purposes of [national banks’] creation, tend to impair or de-
stroy their efficiency as federal agencies or conflict with the paramount law of the 
United States.”75 Having deemed the state law valid, the Court found that the state 
had the power to enforce it, “for such power is essentially inherent in the very con-
ception of law.”76 The Court clarified this proposition in Watters, noting that “when 
state prescriptions significantly impair the exercise of authority, enumerated or in-
cidental under the NBA, the State’s regulations must give way.”77 
C. Legislatures exercise common law visitorial powers over the corporations they charter 
as a public right 
The legal doctrine of visitorial powers has a long common law history. In Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward78 Justice Story traced “visitation” from the king’s power 
at common law over civil corporations.79 Justice Story characterized visitation as a 
property right whereby, in the case of eleemosynary corporations, the founders or 
their assignees may “visit, inquire into, and correct all irregularities and abuses in 
such corporations, and to compel the original purposes of the charity to be faithful-
ly fulfilled.”80 In Guthrie v. Harkness,81 the Court explained that in the United States 
the crown was replaced by the legislature, which acts as “visitor of all corporations 
created by it . . . and may direct judicial proceedings against such corporations for 
such abuses or neglects as would at common law cause forfeiture of their char-
ters.”82 In civil corporations visitation was very much a “public right” that belonged 
to the state.83 A nineteenth century court defined visitation as “the act of a superior 
                                                                
 74. 263 U.S. 640 (1924). 
 75. Id. at 656. 
 76. Id. at 660. 
 77. Watters v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007). In Watters, the Court struck down a state law 
requiring operating subsidiaries of national banks which engaged in the mortgage business to register with the 
state and submit to state supervision and inspection. Id. at 21. 
 78.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 79. Id. at  666–77 (Story, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 673 (citing 1 BL. COM. 480). In the case of Dartmouth College, Justice Story found the visitors 
“may amend and repeal its statutes, remove its officers, correct abuses, and generally superintend the manage-
ment of the trusts.” Id. at 676. 
 81. 199 U.S. 148 (1905). 
 82. Id. at 158 (citation omitted). The Court noted that American corporations could have private visitors, 
but this was rare and “in the absence of such, the State is the visitor of all corporations.” Id. 
 83. Id. at 158–59 (rejecting the view that visitation “would include the private right of the shareholder to 
have an examination of the business in which he is interested, and the right of discovery of the methods and 
means by which the agents of the corporation are conducting its affairs”). 
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or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to examine into its manner of 
conducting business, and enforce an observance of its laws and regulations.”84 In 
Watters, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the definition of “visitation” it established 
in Guthrie as “the act of a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corpora-
tion to examine into its manner of conducting business, and enforce an observance 
of its laws and regulations.”85 
D. The OCC adopted a broad reading of “visitation” and made clear that it exercises 
exclusive visitorial control over national banks 
Congress has vested authority to regulate national banks in the OCC.86 The OCC 
clarified 12 U.S.C. § 484 by promulgating 12 C.F.R. 7.4000.87 This regulation defines 
visitation as “[e]xamination of a bank; [i]nspection of a bank’s books and records; 
[r]egulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to fed-
eral banking law; and [e]nforcing compliance with any applicable federal or state 
laws concerning those activities.”88 More importantly,  the regulation gives a general 
rule that  
[o]nly the OCC or an authorized representative of the OCC may exercise 
visitorial powers with respect to national banks . . . . State officials may not 
exercise visitorial powers with respect to national banks, such as conducting 
examinations, inspecting or requiring the production of books or records of 
national banks, or prosecuting enforcement actions, except in limited cir-
cumstances authorized by federal law.89 
The regulation lists several exceptions to the OCC’s exclusive authority, most 
notably for “courts of justice,” as mandated by the NBA.90 Nevertheless, the OCC 
                                                                
 84. First Nat’l Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740 (C.C.N.D. Oh. 1881). The court here found 
that a county attorney’s subpoena for deposit records in the course of a tax fraud investigation did not involve 
visitorial powers, and therefore the bank should honor the state court subpoena. Id. at 741–43. 
 85. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 14 (2007) (quoting Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 158 
(1905)). 
 86. See 12 U.S.C. § 93a (2006) (“Except to the extent that authority to issue such rules and regulations has 
been expressly and exclusively granted to another regulatory agency, the Comptroller of the Currency is autho-
rized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the office . . .”). 
 87.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 60,092, 60,094 (Nov. 4, 1999) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7.4000); 69 Fed. Reg. 
1,895, (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7.4000). 
 88. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2) (2009). 
 89. Id. at § 7.4000(a)(1). This regulation may have been a response to the Court’s holding in Barnett Bank 
of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (arguing that a federal statute allowing national banks to sell 
insurance preempted a Florida statute prohibiting the practice). See Atri, supra note 58, at 470–71. 
 90. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) (2009); see 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)(2006). 
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interpreted this exception as pertaining only “to the powers inherent in the judi-
ciary” and not as an exception whereby states might “inspect, superintend, direct, 
regulate or compel compliance by a national bank with respect to any law, regard-
ing the content or conduct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal 
law.”91 The OCC thus construed its statutory grant of authority as a broad mandate 
whereby the OCC is, for nearly all purposes, the exclusive regulator and law enforc-
er of national banks and the National Bank Act’s exceptions to that authority are 
given only minimal effect.92 
The Supreme Court appeared to accept the OCC’s position that Congress had 
vested it with exclusive visitorial powers over national banks as recently as 2007.93 In 
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,94 the Court held that when exercising the function 
of a national bank, a national bank or its subsidiaries “is subject to OCC’s superin-
tendence, and not to the licensing, reporting, and visitorial regimes of the several 
States in which the subsidiary operates.”95 Michigan law required mortgage lenders, 
including subsidiaries of national banks, to register with a state office and submit to 
state supervision.96 After Wachovia Mortgage became a wholly owned subsidiary of 
its parent national bank, Wachovia Bank, it claimed exemption from the state regis-
tration and reporting requirements.97 The state informed Wachovia Mortgage that, 
without a state license, “it would no longer be authorized to conduct mortgage 
lending activities in Michigan.”98 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg noted that 
“federal control shields national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative 
state regulation” and that states may not restrict a national bank’s exercise of any 
power granted or implied by the NBA.99 Justice Ginsburg warned that, were Michi-
gan to have its way, national banks could face different regulatory schemes in every 
state—“precisely what the NBA was designed to prevent.”100 Therefore, Justice 
Ginsburg found, “[t]he NBA is thus properly read by OCC to protect from state 
                                                                
 91. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) (2009). 
 92. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a 
Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 233–
37 (2004) (concluding that the OCC’s January 2004 amendments to § 7.4000 preempted the application of all 
state laws to national banks, with two exceptions: state-law standards expressly incorporated in federal statutes, 
and general state laws which do not regulate the business of banking). 
 93. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. Id. at 8. 
 97. Id. at 8–9. 
 98. Id. at 9. 
 99. Id. at 11, 13. The Court in Watters found that federal preemption of state banking laws extends not just 
to the national banks themselves, but also to their state-chartered operating subsidiaries. Id. at 17–20. 
 100. Id. at 14. 
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hindrance a national bank’s engagement in the ‘business of banking’ whether con-
ducted by the bank itself or by an operating subsidiary, empowered to do only what 
the bank itself could do.”101 
Other courts have also accepted the NBA as vesting the OCC with exclusive visi-
torial powers, and have at least tacitly approved various OCC regulations proclaim-
ing that interpretation. In Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. McGraw,102 a district 
court relied on both Watters and the Second Circuit’s holding in Cuomo to find that 
the West Virginia Attorney General’s issuance of subpoenas to a national bank as 
part of an investigation of credit card customers’ complaints was an impermissible 
infringement on the OCC’s visitorial powers.103 In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bou-
tris,104 the Ninth Circuit held that the NBA preempted the California Commissioner 
of Corporations from enforcing state visitation laws, and therefore the Commis-
sioner had no power to order regulatory audits of national bank operating subsidi-
aries.105 In National State Bank, Elizabeth, N.J. v. Long,106 the Third Circuit held that 
the National Bank Act prohibited the New Jersey Commissioner of Banking from 
enforcing anti-redlining statutes against national banks.107 On the other hand, the 
OCC’s jurisdiction is not limitless. As the court pointed out in Hatch v. Fleet Mort-
gage Corp.,108 the OCC does not have exclusive enforcement power over claims that 
“do not directly concern a banking practice” or “are not banking industry specific,” 
such as general consumer fraud or false advertising claims.109 
IV. The Court’s Reasoning 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia considered the question “whether the [OCC]’s 
regulation purporting to pre-empt state law enforcement can be upheld as a reason-
able interpretation of the National Bank Act.”110 Justice Scalia concluded that the 
OCC’s regulation was only a reasonable interpretation of the NBA insofar as it pro-
                                                                
 101. Id. at 21. Justice Ginsburg refers here to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. 
 102. 563 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. W. Va. 2008). 
 103. Id. at 617. 
 104. 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 105. Id. at 964. 
 106. 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 107. Id. at 988–89. The regulation at issue in Long was 12 C.F.R. § 7.6025(b) (1980). 
 108. 158 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Minn. 2001). 
 109. Id. at 966. The court in Fleet Mortgage denied a national bank’s motion to dismiss claims brought by 
Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch for data sharing, inadequate disclosure to customers, and deceptive 
telemarketing. See also Matthew J. Nance, Note, The OCC’s Exclusive Visitorial Authority over National Banks 
After Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 87 TEX. L. REV. 811, 824 (2009). 
 110. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714–15 (2009). Justice Scalia was joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 2714. 
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hibited states from “conducting examinations [and] inspecting or requiring the 
production of books or records of national banks” in terms of states’ role as “super-
visor of corporations.”111 Justice Scalia held that the regulation could not reasonably 
prohibit a state attorney general from suing a national bank to enforce non-
preempted state law, because in civil enforcement actions states act in the role of 
“sovereign-as-law-enforcer” rather than “sovereign-as-supervisor.”112 In this case, 
however, the Attorney General had not brought a judicial enforcement action; he 
had merely threatened to issue executive subpoenas.113 The Court therefore affirmed 
the district court’s injunction barring the Attorney General from issuing executive 
subpoenas, but vacated the portion of the injunction barring the Attorney General 
from bringing judicial enforcement actions.114 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the term “visitorial powers” was at least some-
what ambiguous, but not sufficiently uncertain as to require the Court to give Che-
vron deference to the OCC’s interpretation.115 Justice Scalia found that, even viewing 
the convoluted evolution of visitation “through the clouded lens of history,” the 
outer limits of “visitorial powers” do not include “ordinary enforcement of the 
law.”116 Justice Scalia pointed to “the well established distinction between supervi-
sion and law enforcement” and construed the Court’s recent holding in Watters as 
only prohibiting states from exercising “general supervision and control” over na-
tional bank subsidiaries, because “‘multiple audits and surveillance under rival 
oversight regimes’ would cause uncertainty.”117 Justice Scalia also noted that, even 
within the federal government, the OCC does not enjoy exclusive law enforcement 
powers over national banks.118 Unlike the OCC, Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
“courts of justice” exception to the NBA did not refer merely to inherent powers of 
the judiciary,119 but instead allowed state attorneys general to enforce state laws 
through the courts—thereby “[preserving] a regime of exclusive administrative 
                                                                
 111. Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(1) (2009). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2722. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2715. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2717. 
 118. Id. (citing Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 105–06 (D.C. Cir. 1939)). 
 119. Id. at 2718; see 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(b)(2) (2009) (“Exception for courts of justice. National banks are sub-
ject to such visitorial powers as are vested in the courts of justice. This exception pertains to the powers inherent 
in the judiciary and does not grant state or other governmental authorities any right to inspect, superintend, 
direct, regulate or compel compliance by a national bank with respect to any law, regarding the content or con-
duct of activities authorized for national banks under Federal law.”). 
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oversight by the [OCC] while honoring in fact rather than merely in theory Con-
gress’s decision not to pre-empt substantive state law.”120 
Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part because he considered 
the OCC’s interpretation of visitorial powers to be a reasonable construction of the 
NBA.121 Justice Thomas reasoned that “visitation” can have multiple reasonable 
meanings—including both the OCC’s broad dictionary definition “and a common-
law history suggesting that the scope of the visitor’s authority varied in accordance 
with the nature of the organization under supervision.”122 Although not as narrow 
as the reading the Attorney General advocated, Justice Thomas noted that the OCC 
did choose “a more modest construction than could have been supported by the 
common-law and dictionary definition,” making the OCC’s interpretation seem 
more reasonable.123 
V. Analysis 
Attorney General Cuomo hailed the Court’s ruling as “a huge win for consumers 
across the nation” that “reaffirms the vital role State Attorneys General play in pro-
tecting consumers from illegal and improper practices by our country’s biggest and 
most powerful banks.”124 Nevertheless, the national banking system will likely suffer 
from dual state and federal law enforcement. Our federalist system has always had 
the feature (or problem) of dual federal and state regulation in many areas, and 
banking is no different.125 States do have a legitimate role in certain banking regula-
tion, but courts should take care to define separate spheres for federal and state 
banking regulation.126 Otherwise, a “national patchwork of conflicting regula-
                                                                
 120. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2718. The Court also noted that, when a state enforces state law through the 
courts, it “w ll be treated like a litigant” and subject to civil discovery rules, which, in New York, are “far more 
limited than the full range of ‘visitorial powers’ that may be exercised by a sovereign.” Id. at 2718–19. 
 121. Id. at 2722 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy and Alito. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2727. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, Office of the Attorney General, Statement from Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo on Supreme Court Decision in Cuomo v. Clearinghouse Association (June 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/june/june29a_09.html. 
 125. See, e.g., Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985–86 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that, even though na-
tional banks were subject to New Jersey antidiscrimination statute, New Jersey officials could not enforce the 
statute against national banks because such enforcement was the exclusive responsibility of the OCC). 
 126. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 913 (2007); 
Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State Consumer 
Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 983, 994–1007 (2006) (explaining the tension between federal 
and state regulatory authority and pointing to the Tenth Amendment as a cure). 
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tions”127 could easily result. The Supreme Court should have accepted the OCC’s 
regulation as a permissible construction of the NBA and affirmed the judgments 
below.128 The Court’s division between “sovereign-as-law-enforcer” and “sovereign-
as-supervisor” will likely prove to be a distinction without a difference.129  The 
Court should have done more to delineate the respective scopes of federal and state 
regulation, and will likely need to address this in a future case.130 
A. The Supreme Court should have accepted the OCC regulation as a permissible 
construction of the National Bank Act 
The NBA is, at best, ambiguous in its reference to “visitorial powers.”131 Therefore, 
under the Chevron framework, the Court should have given greater deference to the 
OCC’s interpretation that it possessed exclusive visitorial authority over national 
banks and accepted the regulation as a permissible construction of the statute. Un-
der Chevron, the reviewing court must give the regulation “controlling weight un-
less [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”132 As Justice 
Thomas pointed out, “visitorial powers” can have multiple meanings, and the 
OCC’s interpretation was not as broad as earlier common law understandings of 
visitation.133 As found by the lower courts, the OCC’s regulation was a permissible 
construction of the statute.134 The Court itself implicitly accepted the OCC’s con-
struction in Watters only two years before.135 In fact, Cuomo was the first time in a 
                                                                
 127. John Schwartz, Bank Regulation Case Pits U.S. Against States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at B3. 
 128. See infra Part V.A. 
 129. But cf. John L. Ropiequet, Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C.: The Supreme Court Redefines 
the Federal-State Regulatory Balance for National Banks, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POL’Y REP. 14, 14, 19 (2009). 
 130. See Leading Cases, Preemption of State Law Enforcement, 123 HARV. L. REV. 322, 332 (2009) (suggesting 
that the Court will have to address the relationship between Chevron analysis of an agency regulation and fede-
ralism concerns in a future case). 
 131. Although reasonable judicial minds could disagree on whether the statute is ambiguous, see id.  at 331 
(criticizing the Court’s Chevron analysis for grounding the entire opinion in the construction of the term “visi-
torial powers,” after conceding its ambiguity), both Justice Scalia, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. 
Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) (“We can discern the outer limits of the term ‘visitorial powers’ even through the clouded 
lens of history.”), and Justice Thomas, id. at 2722 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), agree 
that the term “visitorial powers” is at least somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
OCC’s interpretation was unreasonable and not entitled to Chevron deference. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715. 
 132. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 133. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2723, 2727 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 134. See Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2007); OCC v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 
383, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 135. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank N.A. 550 U.S. 1, 14 (referring to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2) for its defini-
tion of visitorial powers). The Watters Court upheld a closely related regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, which pro-
vides that state laws only “apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply 
to the parent national bank.”12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006). The Court held that the Michigan Commissioner of 
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long series of cases where the Court did not accept the OCC’s interpretation of a 
statute.136 The Court should have accepted the agency’s reading of the statute, “even 
if [it] differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”137B. 
The OCC’s interpretation of the National Bank Act allowed for consistent regulation of 
the national banking industry 
 
Federalism concerns aside, the OCC’s assertion of exclusive enforcement power 
over national banks at least ensured consistent enforcement of law according to 
principles emanating from one office. At oral argument, Justice Breyer doubted 
“that 51 different individuals, 50 State attorneys general plus one Federal individual, 
will reach the same result.”138 Although centralized federal enforcement of state law 
may prevent states from acting as laboratories in developing new systems of regula-
tion—a key feature of federalism139—national banking has always been an area of 
federal control.140 The OCC is uniquely situated to use its enforcement discretion to 
enforce a consistent body of law against national banks, tacitly choosing not to en-
force those local provisions that may conflict with a greater national scheme.141 The 
national banking industry would certainly benefit from a consistent scheme of na-
                                                                                                                                                    
Financial and Insurance Services could not enforce state real estate and mortgage lending laws against national 
banks or their operating subsidiaries, because that would be a “state hindrance” in a national bank’s engaging in 
the “business of banking.” Watters, 550 U.S. at 21. 
 136. See Atri, supra note 58, at 473. Atri argues that, before Cuomo, the Court was “likely to grant Chevron 
deference when federalism implications [were] not at issue,” but to avoid applying the Chevron framework 
“where federalism concerns were abundant” by concluding that the statute was unambiguous. Id. at 490. In 
Cuomo, however, Atri argues that the Court reached a middle ground by applying the Chevron framework even 
though federalism concerns were present, but not according the regulation deference. Id. at 491–92. 
 137. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
 138. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08-
453). 
 139. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One of federalism’s chief 
virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibil ty that ‘a single courageous State 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.’”) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting)). 
 140. See Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2005), cert denied, 546 U.S. 817 
(2005) (“The presumption against federal preemption disappears, however, in fields of regulation that have 
been substantially occupied by federal authority for an extended period of time . . . . Regulation of federally 
chartered banks is one such area.” (citation omitted)); see also Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 
309 F.3d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (tracing federal preemption of state laws regulating national banks back to 
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)). 
 141. See Francesca S. Laguardia, Recent Development, Enforcing the Fair Housing Act: Can Agency Interpre-
tations Override Congressional Intent in Anti-discrimination Legislation?, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 535, 
545–46 (2006)). 
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tional regulation.142 Although Justice Scalia worried at oral argument that the OCC 
does not have “spare time” to enforce state law,143 perhaps that is exactly the point. 
The OCC best serves the banking industry and the public by shielding banks from 
excessive and conflicting state regulation.144 In removing this shield, the Court ig-
nores the clear intent of the NBA and its own precedent.145 
C. State attorneys general are already using their new-found enforcement power 
At least one state attorney general has made use of this new-found state enforce-
ment power against national banks.146 Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a 
                                                                
 142. See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of State Con-
sumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 896, 897–926 (2008) (discussing “federal preemption of state 
banking law based . . . on a theory of congressional intent to permit national banks to provide consistent bank-
ing services nationwide, without any interference from inconsistent state regulations.” Id. at 896). 
 143. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) (No. 08-
453). 
 144. See G. Marcus Cole, Protecting Consumers from Consumer Protection, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 2007 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 251, 275 (2007) (advocating federal preemption as a way to combat short-sighted state con-
sumer protection laws which threaten to have a chilling effect on the credit market); see also Alexandra Kut-
chins, Note, Visitorial Powers and the General Power to Enforce the Law: Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of 
New York v. The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 163, 179–80 (2009) (discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of a “pro-federalism” view of state banking regulation). 
 145. See Michael Edwards, The Changing Landscape of Financial Services Law in 2009: Federal Preemption, 
Credit Rating Agency Liability, and Regulatory Reform Legislation, 6 BUS. L. BRIEF (Am. U.) 27, 29–30 (2010) 
(noting that the Cuomo Court receded from the high-water mark of federal preemption jurisprudence reached 
in Watters). Edwards notes that “[i]n an increasingly national (and global) financial system, the regulatory 
compliance costs of a federally-chartered financial institution conforming to what the OCC Comptroller John 
C. Dugan has called a patchwork of state laws are higher than the regulatory compliance costs under a single set 
of federal rules.” Id. at 29. Nevertheless, Edwards concludes that the Court’s decision in Cuomo provides a rea-
sonable preemption framework:  
Taken together, Watters and Cuomo establish a reasonable rule for federal preemption under the 
NBA: the Act and the OCC regulations preempt conflicting state laws; state bank regulators cannot 
take administrative actions—such as examinations of books and records or enforcement hearings 
held before an administrative law judge—against national banks, but state attorneys general may 
sue a national bank if the bank violates state laws that are not preempted by federal law. This rule is 
reasonable because it fairly balances the state’s interest in enforcing its own, non-preempted laws—
laws that the OCC could theoretically use its discretion not to enforce and therefore nullify for prac-
tical purposes if the Court had not ruled the way it did in Cuomo—while at the same time preserv-
ing the ability of national banks and their subsidiaries to operate under a single set of federal rules 
in any state in most respects. 
Id.  
 146. See Ropiequet, supra note 129, at 18–19. Attorney General Madigan has confirmed that the Cuomo 
decision “green-lighted” her decision to file suit against Wells Fargo and that she was “the first state attorney 
general to sue a national lender for its role in creating this crisis.” Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, 111th Cong. (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2010_01 
/AGMadiganFCICWrittenTestimony.pdf. (testimony of Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney General). 
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complaint in state court on July 31, 2009, against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., alleging 
racial discrimination in mortgage lending in violation of Illinois fair lending and 
consumer protection laws.147 In a press release, Attorney General Madigan linked 
Wells Fargo’s allegedly discriminatory practices to the recent subprime mortgage 
crisis: “By targeting African-American’s [sic] for the sale of its highest-cost and 
riskiest loans, Wells Fargo drained wealth from families and neighborhoods and 
added to the stockpile of boarded-up homes that are an open invitation to crimi-
nals.”148 In prepared written testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion, Madigan charged that the OCC was “lax in its efforts to protect consumers 
from the coming crisis” and gave lenders “implicit authorization to expand their 
subprime offerings without fear of state prosecution.”149 She applauded the Court’s 
ruling in Cuomo because it “dealt a serious blow to the OCC’s sweeping preemption 
rules and affirmed the right of states to hold national banks and their subsidiaries 
accountable for violations of fair lending laws.”150  
Attorney General Madigan is likely at the forefront of a coming trend among 
state attorneys general to enforce state banking laws against national banks operat-
ing in their states — especially in light of the recent financial crisis. Although the 
crisis may have resulted in part from a regulatory failure, the best way to move for-
ward is by centralized, consistent regulation.151 A “patchwork” of local law enforce-
ment efforts is counter-productive and should be avoided.152 Whether these new en-
forcement actions are meritorious is of no moment. The mere fact that banks must 
respond to and defend themselves against more actions by more enforcement enti-
                                                                
 147. Illinois v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09CH26434, 2009 WL 2356628 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. July 31, 
2009). As Ropiequet points out, this comes close to the line between sovereign-as-visitor and sovereign-as-law-
enforcer, but does not cross it: Attorney General Madigan did issue an administrative subpoena instead of a 
subpoena through the courts, but she chose not to attempt to enforce it. John L. Ropiequet, The Supreme Court 
Limits Federal Preemption in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C., 63 CONSUM. FIN. L.Q. REP. 146, 83 
(2009). 
 148. Press Release, Illinois Attorney General, Madigan Sues Wells Fargo for Discriminatory and Deceptive 
Mortgage Practices, July 31, 2009, http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2009_07/20090731.html. 
 149. Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, supra note 146, at 9, 10. 
 150. Id. at 11. 
 151. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt, Speech, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First Century, 25 
YALE J. ON REG. 315, 318–19 (2008) (warning of excessive costs of dealing with a “balkanized regulatory regime” 
in terms of inconsistent regulation across different financial products and sectors). Some have also argued for 
consistent regulation on a global scale to prevent banks in different countries from suffering competitive disad-
vantage in the post-crisis marketplace. See Patricia Kowsmann, Barclay’s Diamond Says Regulation Must Be 
Global, DOW JONES BUS. NEWS, Oct. 25, 2010. 
 152. See Edwards, supra note 145, at 29. 
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ties introduces litigation costs which would not have been incurred in the pre-
Cuomo world.153 
D. The Court did too little to clarify the difference between “visitation” and “law 
enforcement” 
The Court in Cuomo did not hide the fact that it was interpreting a generally murky 
area of the law. Justice Scalia admitted that “[t]here is necessarily some ambiguity as 
to the meaning of the statutory term ‘visitorial powers.’”154 Even though the Court 
could only view visitation “through the clouded lens of history,” it still concluded 
that the OCC’s regulation went too far.155 Unfortunately, the Court added insuffi-
cient clarity to this legal quagmire. The respective scope of federal and state regula-
tion of national banks remains uncertain and should have been more directly ad-
dressed by the Court in Cuomo.156 For example, the Court pointed out that the 
OCC’s regulation did not and could not exclude “state enforcement of all state laws 
against national banks,”157 but surely the Court does not mean that states may en-
force all state laws. Longstanding doctrine states that national banks are not subject 
to those state laws which “infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue 
burden on the performance of the banks’ functions.”158 The court in Fleet Mortgage 
distinguished between a state’s impermissible enforcement of laws which are di-
rected primarily at the banking industry, and a state’s permissible enforcement of 
those laws which are more general in nature or did not directly concern a banking 
practice.159 Some commentators have correctly pointed out that Cuomo only allows 
                                                                
 153. In the post-Cuomo world, national banks can theoretically face separate enforcement actions by sepa-
rate enforcement authorities in each of the states in which they operate. In the pre-Cuomo world, although the 
OCC could have acted against national banks to enforce state law in various states, these actions were controlled 
by a single enforcement authority and national banks could at least hope for a consistent enforcement strategy 
or policy. 
 154. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, LLC, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009). 
 155. Id. 
 156. On the other hand, some have concluded that the Court’s decision actually resolved some uncertainty 
and provides a reasonable framework for national banks and states to follow.  See Edwards, supra note 145, at 29 
(“Taken together, Watters and Cuomo establish a reasonable rule for federal preemption under the NBA: the Act 
and the OCC regulations preempt conflicting state laws; state bank regulators cannot take administrative ac-
tions—such as examinations of books and records or enforcement hearings held before an administrative law 
judge—against national banks, but state attorneys general may sue a national bank if the bank violates state laws 
that are not preempted by federal law.”); Kutchins, supra note 144, at 180 (“Taken together with Watters, . . . 
the rule the Court seems to have adopted is that states may impose consumer protection laws on national banks 
and enforce them as long as the laws do not have the characteristics of an oversight regime.”). 
 157. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2719 (emphasis in original). 
 158. Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944). 
 159. Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (D. Minn. 2001). See Nance, supra note 
109, at 823–24 (exploring the Fleet Mortgage holding that states may not enforce laws which “directly [concern] 
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states to enforce non-preempted state laws, but even so the question of which state 
laws are preempted is not settled law.160 A distinction between the types of laws 
states may and may not enforce against national banks would have provided clear 
guidance for national banks and state officials. 
That is not, however, the approach the Court took in Cuomo. In the context of 
an investigation into banking practices, Justice Scalia drew the line between “visita-
tion” and “law enforcement,” and explained that a sovereign-as-visitor “may in-
spect books and records at any time for any or no reason,” whereas a sovereign-as-
law-enforcer must act as a civil litigant and obtain information through ordinary 
civil discovery processes.161 This distinction could easily result in a law enforcer re-
ceiving the same information as a visitor, only the law enforcer will receive the in-
formation more slowly and only after jumping through a series of procedural 
hoops.162 This could mean that the OCC and the states will accomplish the same re-
sults, but at much greater cost for the states. This distinction is artificial and un-
helpful.  
E. The Court gave states too much power to enforce state laws against national banks 
through the courts. 
The Court’s holding in Cuomo opens the door for intrusive state oversight through 
the courts. Indeed, the Court attempted to divide a state’s powers between its im-
permissible role as “sovereign-as-supervisor” and its permissible role as “sovereign-
as-law-enforcer.”163 The only clear limit on a state’s authority, however, is that it 
may not act as “sovereign-as-supervisor” to order a national bank to open its 
records for inspection or require a bank to file periodic reports. Justice Scalia cor-
rectly pointed out that, unlike visitation, judicial enforcement reduces a state to the 
                                                                                                                                                    
the business of banking” as a way to determine the boundary between state and OCC authority over national 
banks).  
 160. See Kutchins, supra note 144, at 180–81 (“Although [Cuomo] did not decide the issue of whether state 
consumer protection laws were preempted, it did recognize that the states do have some authority and regulato-
ry power over national banks. The uncertain extent of that authority, which has yet to be articulated by the 
Court or the OCC, is what has been causing the banking industry’s anxiety.”); see also David L. Beam & Ralph 
T. Wutscher, The New Trajectory of Federal Preemption, 65 BUS. LAW. 645, 650 (2010) (“Before Cuomo, the Visi-
torial Powers Rule protected national banks from enforcement actions by states in these situations. Now, na-
tional banks increasingly may be forced to litigate preemption issues of first impression with state attorneys 
general.”). 
 161. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2719. 
 162. See Elvira Pereda, Note, Cuomo v. Clearing House Association: Protecting Minorities from Discrimina-
tory Lending Practices by Upholding States’ Right to Enforce Predatory Lending Laws, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 317, 327 (2010) (noting that state attorneys general acting as civil litigants can only file claims 
“grounded on a legitimate basis of law and fact”). 
 163. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2721. 
VOL. 6 NO. 2 2011 509 
status of an ordinary civil litigant.164 Nevertheless, civil discovery rules are still loose 
enough that state attorneys general can obtain a wide range of information by sub-
poena—anything short of “‘fishing expeditions’ or an undirected rummaging 
through bank books and records for evidence of some unknown wrongdoing.”165 
The pragmatic difference between visitation and judicial enforcement is not as 
“clear” as Justice Scalia suggests—in fact, in  reality the information a state attorney 
general may obtain by judicial enforcement may not be that different from the in-
formation the OCC obtains through visitation.166 Although elected state attorneys 
general may have the best interests of their constituents at heart—if not their own 
self-interest in reelection—these concerns are likely to conflict with the goal of hav-
ing an efficient national banking system, especially in the current climate of popular 
distrust and even animosity toward banks in general.167 
VI. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court held in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.168 that state at-
torneys general may enforce state laws against national banks through judicial 
                                                                
 164. Id. at 2718–19. 
 165. Id. at 2719. 
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specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (2006). See also Pereda, supra note 162, at 327 (noting that attorneys general acting as civil 
litigants can only file claims “grounded on a legitimate basis of law and fact”). 
 167. See David A. Scheffel, The National Bank Act: So Much for Preemption, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 1. But 
see Fisher, supra note 126, at 1028–29 (proposing the Tenth Amendment as an effective check on the OCC’s 
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and is subject to institutional pressures and regulatory capture.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal 
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 168. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). 
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process.169 In so doing, the Court ignored Congress’s intent in enacting the National 
Bank Act to establish a system of consistent nationwide banking regulation,170 as 
well as the OCC’s reasonable construction of Congress’s clear grant of exclusive vi-
sitorial authority over national banks. 171 After Cuomo, national banks will have to 
contend with 51 enforcement authorities and a corresponding 51 interpretations of 
banking law.172 Even if the recent financial crisis played in the Court’s collective 
mind, the Court should have stayed away from an extra-judicial policy arena and 
instead deferred to the OCC’s interpretation of the National Bank Act.173 
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